Fourth Place: John Ashcroft, et al. v. Free Speech Coalition, et al. by Hosseini, Mary & Tran, Mai
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
David E. Snodgrass Moot Court Competition Student Scholarship
11-14-2001




Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/moot_court
This Brief - Prize 04 is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Scholarship at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in David E. Snodgrass Moot Court Competition by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation





SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL 
OF THE UNITED STATES, et al., 
Petitioners,
V.
THE FREE SPEECH COALITION, et al., 
Respondents.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS









1. May the Government, in the interest of protecting children, ban visual depictions of 
children engaging in sexually explicit material that is virtually indistinguishable from real 
child pornography, where this Court settled in New York v. Ferber that child pornography 
is a category of unprotected speech?
2. Is the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 constitutional if its breadth only reaches 
those images necessary to prevent the harmful effects of child pornography?
3. Is the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 not constitutionally vague as it 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL 
OF THE UNITED STATES, et al., 
Petitioners,
V.
THE FREE SPEECH COALITION, et al., 
Respondents.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
Petitioners, John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States and the Department of 
Justice respectfully submit this brief and request that this Court REVERSE the judgment of the 
United States Court of Appeals on the constitutionality of the Child Pornography Prevention Act.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo issues of law and facial challenges to a statute, Margolis v. 
Ryan, 140 F.3d 850, 852 (9th Cir. 1998) (issues of federal law reviewed de novo); U.S. v. 
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 322 (1998) (quoting Ornelas v. U.S.. 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996)) (facial 
challenges reviewed de novo). This Court when reviewing congressional findings gives great 
deference to Congress. Peel v. Atty. Registration, 496 U.S. 91, 99 (1990),
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Preliminary Statement
This is an appeal from the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit that struck down the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (“CPPA”) as 
unconstitutional. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1999).
Respondents Free Speech Coalition, Bold Type, Inc., Jim Gingerich, and Ron Raffaelli 
("Coalition") filed a complaint with the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California against Reno and the United States Department of Justice on January 27, 1997 
( Government"). (Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 1-2.) The Coalition sought declaratory and injunctive 
relief to permanently enjoin enforcement of certain provisions of the CPPA. (J.A. 1.)
The Government and the Coalition moved for summary judgment on March 24,1997. 
(J.A. 14.) The district court granted the Government’s motion for summary judgment on August 
12, 1997 and ruled that the CPPA met the constitutional standards; (1) it was content-neutral; (2) 
not constitutionally vague or overbroad; and (3) did not constitute a prior restraint of speech. 
(J.A. 85.) The district court also found that the CPPA’s affirmative defense did not 
impermissibly shift the burden of proof because of an unconstitutional presumption. Free 
Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1086.
The Coalition appealed to the Ninth Circuit. (J.A. 87.) The Ninth Circuit affirmed 
questions of standing and prior restraint on speech and reversed on the questions of the 
constitutionality of the statutory language “appears to be” and “conveys the impression.” Free 
Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1097. The panel majority denied the Government’s petition for 
rehearing and rejected the suggestions for rehearing en banc on July 24,2000. Free Speech 
Coalition v. Reno, 220 F.3d 1113, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000). This Court granted certiorari on January 
22, 2001. Holder V. Free Speech Coalition, 121 S. Ct. 876 (2001).
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Statement of Facts
Congress, for nearly 25 years, enacted various laws in attempt to eliminate the sexual 
exploitation of children and rid our communities of the scourge of child pornography. S. Rep. 
No. 104-358, 1,22 (1996). There was a need to address virtual child pornography because the 
current federal laws did not confront the technological advances in the child pornography 
industry. Id. at 7. The most recent attempt to combat child pornography is the CPPA. Id.
A. History of Child Pornography Laws
Congress first passed the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 
that criminalized conduct that used minors in sexually explicit material. Pub. L. No. 95-225,92 
Stat. 7 (1978). A few years later, this Court upheld the constitutionality of a state statute that 
prohibited the dissemination of child pornography and placed child pornography in the category 
of unprotected speech and outside the scope of the First Amendment. N. Y. v. Ferber^ 458 U.S. 
773,747 (1982). The Court provided the following reasons for its holding: (1) the state’s 
interest in protecting the physical and psychological well being of minors is compelling; (2) the 
distribution of child pornography is intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children in that the 
materials are a permanent record of the child’s acts and their circulation exacerbates the harm to 
the child and the distribution network of child pornography must cease to exist to control the 
production of sexually explicit material; (3) the child pornography industry provide an economic 
motive for and is thus an integral part of the illegal production of such materials; (4) the value of 
live performances and photographic materials of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is 
exceedingly modest, if not de minimis; and (5) it is not incompatible with earlier decisions to 
recognize and classify child pornography as a category of material outside the protection of the 
First Amendment. Id. at 756-63.
3
Almost immediately. Congress amended the pornography laws to include aspects of this 
Court’s decision. The Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (1984). 
When Congress enacted the Child Protection Act, it: (1) raised the age limit for protecting 
children from 16 years old to 18 years old; (2) eliminated the commercial purpose requirement; 
(3) changed the phrase “visual or print medium” to “visual depiction;” and (4) substituted the 
word “lascivious” for the word “lewd.” Id. Two years later, in 1986, Congress enacted The 
Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act to ban advertisements for child pornography. Pub. L. 
No. 99-628, 100 Stat. 3510 (1986). Congress continued to stop the movement of child 
pornography with the Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988, which made the 
use of a computer for distribution or transport of child pornography illegal and required 
producers to create and maintain records of the identities and ages of the performers. Pub. L. 
No. 100-690,102 Stat. 4485 (1988). Six years later, this Court upheld a state statute prohibiting 
the possession of child pornography. Osborne v. Ohio. 495 U.S. 103,126 (1990).
B. The Loophole in Federal Law
Before the CPPA, the law prohibited the production and distribution of visual images of 
actual children engaged in sexually explicit conduct. With advances in computer technology, it 
became difficult to regulate the child pornography industry. S. Rep. No. 104-358 at 7. 
Depictions that did not require the use of actual children in their productions fell outside of the 
scope of child pornography laws.
The CPPA closed the loopholes in the federal child pornography laws. Id. at 28. The 
federal child pornography laws did not address the “technological advances in the recording, 
creation, alteration, production, reproduction, distribution and transmission of visual images and 
depictions, particularly through the use of computers.” Id. at 7. The CPPA specifically
4
eliminates the use of computer technology for the creation and distribution of virtual child 
pornography. S. Rep. No. 104-358 at 7.
The CPPA prohibits sexually explicit images of children produced without the use of 
actual children. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (1999).* Congress believed this extension was appropriate, 
as technology has made visual depictions that appear to be of minors in sexually explicit 
materials virtually indistinguishable from unretouched photographs of actual children engaging 
in identical sexual conduct. S. Rep. No. 104-358 at 22. The loopholes created by technological 
advances required that the government update federal law to keep up with the pace of the 
technology of pornography, /rf. at 17.
C. Congressional Findings in Support of the CPPA
Congress found that because computer-generated images of child engaged in sexually 
explicit conduct are virtually indistinguishable from photographic images, the harm is virtually 
indistinguishable. S. Rep. No. 104-358 at 17-18. On June 4,1996, the Committee heard 
testimony to support the finding that the danger to actual children, with respect to child sexual 
abuse and exploitation, is as great when the child pomographer or child molester uses visual 
depictions of child sexual activity produced wholly or in part by computer technology, as when 
the material consists of unretouched photographic images of actual children engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct. Id. at 17-18.
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Kevin Di Gregory testified that child pornography 
poses a grave risk to children and feeds pedophile lusts. Id. at 12. Another expert. Mrs. Dee 
Jepsen, testified that pornography “is an addiction that escalates, requiring more graphic or 
violent material for arousal, then leads to the people in the materials being seen as objects,
' Unless otherwise stated, all statutory citations refer to Title 18 of the United States Code 
(1999).
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without personality, rights, dignity or feelings.” S. Rep. No. 104-358 at 13. The final stage of 
acting out the pornographic conduct leads to sexual exploitation and violent crimes. Id. Dr. 
Victor Cline testified that the majority of pedophiles “use child pornography and/or create it to 
stimulate and whet their sexual appetites which they masturbate to then use later as a model for 
their sexual acting out with children.” Id. With the ability to “morph” images via a computer, 
pedophiles and pomographers can create “custom-tailored” pornography that will heighten the 
material’s effect on the viewers and the threat to children. Id. at 16.
Senator Biden states that child pornography has no redeeming value and that child 
pornography deserves no First Amendment protection because of the harm it causes. Id. at 28. 
Senator Biden described the crime of child photography as a devastating act, damaging a child’s 
trust in others and their own sense of self-respect and self-esteem. Id.
Congress described child pornography as a particularly pernicious evil, something that no 
civilized society can or should tolerate. Id. at 12. Based on all the evidence. Congress found that 
child pornography: (1) abuses, degrades and exploits the weakest and most vulnerable members 
of society, children; (2) poisons the minds and spirits of youth, robbing them of their innocence; 
and (3) debases society as a whole and sought to further combat the evils of child pornography 
with the enactment of the CPPA. Id. Computer-generated images fuel the child pornography 
market. Organized crime’s third biggest moneymaker is pornography, including child 
pornography, after drugs and gambling. Id. Pedophiles can buy readily available, off-the-shelf 
image-editing and “morphing” computer software for as little as $50. Id. at 16. With this 
technology, they can custom-tailor pornography to satisfy their special preferences. Id.
The advances in technology have further hindered governmental attempts to prevent the 
harms of child pornography. Id. at 7. Because computer-generated images are virtually 
indistinguishable from photographic depictions of child sexual activity, it is virtually impossible
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for prosecutors to identify individuals or to prove the use of children. S. Rep. No. 104-358 at 16. 
Deputy Assistant Attorney Genera! Kevin Di Gregory testified that child pomographers attempt 
to use the gap in our existing law as a legal defense. Id, at 17. Statutes that make it illegal for 
anyone to possess child pornography produced using real children would be unenforceable and 
pedophiles that possess pornographic depictions of actual children would escape liability. Id. at 
20.
Based on these findings, Congress concluded that the government has a compelling 
interest to eliminate child pornography and protect children from sexual exploitation. Id, at 3. 
With that purpose, Congress enacted the CPPA.
D. The Statutory Language of the CPPA
The most recent congressional attempt to combat child pornography is the CPPA. S.
Rep. No. 104-358 at 7. The CPPA expands previous child pornography laws to cover unforeseen
technological advances in child pornography. Id. The CPPA revises sections 2251, 2252, 2256
and adds section 2252A to Title 18, Chapter 110 of the United States Code (J.A. 4.) As
currently revised, section 2252A prohibits any person who knowingly: (1) mails, transports,
ships, receives or distributes, including by computer, any child pornography; and sells or
possesses any book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, computer disk, or any other material
that contains three or more images of child pornography.
The Coalition questions the scope of the CPPA*s use of the words “appears to be” and
“conveys the impression” provisions found in sections (B) and (D) of the section 2256(8). As
amended, the CPPA defines child pornography as:
Any depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or 
computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, 
mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where-
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(A) the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
(B) such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor is engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct; or
(C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that 
an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or
(D) such visual depiction is advertised, promoted, presented, described, or 
distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression that the material 
is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct.
18 U.S.C. §2256(8) (1999).
“Sexually explicit conduct” is actual or simulated:
(A) sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or 
oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex;
(B) bestiality;
(C) masturbation;
(D) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or
(E) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or public area of any person.
18 U.S.C. §2256(2) (1999).
The CPPA provides two affirmative defenses in section 2252(A). Defendants may 
escape liability if they can show that the pornography is of an actual adult at time of production 
and they did not advertise, promote, present, describe, or distribute the material in such a manner 
as to convey the impression that it is or contains an image of a minor. The CPPA also provides a 
safe harbor for people charged with possession if they possessed less than three pieces of 
sexually explicit material of children and promptly and in good faith destroyed such material or 
reported the matter to a law enforcement agency.
E. Coalition Challenges to the CPPA.
Congress incorporated its legislative findings into the statute and intended to be clear 
about their purpose of protecting children. S. Rep. No. 104-358 at 2. After the enactment of the 
CPPA, the Coalition filed suit to question the constitutionality of CPPA. (J.A. 1.) The Coalition 
includes a trade association of businesses involved in the production and distribution of “adult-
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oriented materials/* a publisher associated with nudism, and individuals including a painter of 
nude models and a photographer of nude and erotic images. (J.A. 3.) The Coalition sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief by a pre-enforcement challenge to certain provisions of the 
CPPA and a declaration that the CPPA was unconstitutional because it infringed upon their First 
and Fifth Amendment rights. (J.A. 1-2.)
The district court granted the Government’s motion for summary judgment on August 12, 
1997 reasoning that the CPPA met the constitutional standards as: (1) it was content-neutral; (2) 
not constitutionally vague or overbroad; and (3) did not constitute a prior restraint of speech. 
(J.A. 85.) The district court and Congress recognized that the dangers of child pornography do 
not only harm the children actually used in the sexually explicit material. (J.A. 71.) Also, the 
district court found that Congress acknowledged that computer technology is capable of 
“alter[ing] perfectly innocent pictures of children... to create visual depictions of those children 
engaging in any imaginable form of sexual conduct.” S. Rep. No. 104-358 at 15. Moreover, the 
CPPA burdens no more speech than necessary to protect children from the harms of child 
pornography. (J.A. 78.) The court found the CPPA not overbroad because it specifics only 
materials that do not use adults and that appear to be child pornography. (J.A. 82.) The CPPA 
was not vague because it did exactly what the Supreme Court required of child pornography 
legislation as it clearly defines the prohibited conduct as the depiction of children and what 
appears to be children in sexually explicit conduct and suitably limits and describes the category 
of forbidden conduct with affirmative defenses. (J.A. 83.)
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed on the issues of standing and prior restraint on 
speech, but reversed on the constitutionality of the CPPA. Free Speech Coalition^ 198 F.3d at 
1097. The court held that the “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” provisions were 
vague and overbroad. Id. Applying Ferber, the majority reasoned that the CPPA does not
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sufficiently relate to the compelling interest in regulating child pornography because that interest 
is only implicated when the depictions involve real children. Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 
1095. Judge Ferguson, in his dissent, argued that the virtual child pornography should join the 
ranks of real child pornography as a class of unprotected speech because Congress provided 
compelling evidence that virtual child pornography causes real harm to real children. Id. at 
1098.
On July 24, 2000 the Ninth Circuit denied the Government’s petition for a rehearing and 
rejected suggestions for a rehearing en banc. Free Speech Coalition, 220 F.3d at 1114. Judge 
Wardlaw, in her dissent, argued that the panel majority narrowed the compelling interest to only 
include prevention of harm to real children used in production of pornographic images. Id. She 
identified two more compelling governmental interests that the panel majority failed to consider: 
(1) the prevention of harm to real children when pedophiles use child pornography to seduce 
other children into sexual activity; and (2) the interest in ensuring the ability to enforce 
prohibitions of actual child pornography. Id.
The result of the Ninth Circuit decision is that it is the outlier within the Circuits that 
have assessed the constitutionality of the CPP A. Four other circuits have upheld the 
constitutionality of the CPPA. See U.S. v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61,65 (1st Cir. 1999); U.S. v. Mento, 
231 F.3d 912,923 (4th Cir. 2000); U.S. v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 397 (5th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. 
Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 648 (11th Cir. 1999). The Government seeks to effectuate legislative 
intent and the determination that the CPPA is constitutional. (J.A. 11.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (“CPPA”) is constitutional. The CPPA 
bans only sexually explicit material depicting minors that is virtually indistinguishable fi-om 
child pornography. This Court held in that child pyomography is an unprotected category of
10
■spc^cli. A.}. r. / erhcr, -t5S U.S. 747, 765 (1982). The CPPA does no more than what Ferber 
has ouUincd as permissible restrictions on this very narrow category of unprotected speech.
Pollowing this Court’s guidance, Congress passed the CPPA. Congress held extensive 
hearings to carefully consider the evidence and hours of expert testimony. The evidence showed 
that pedophiles used child pornography: (1) to break down children’s inhibitions; (2) gratify 
their sexual appetites; (3) fuel the underground child pornography market; and (4) avoid 
prosecution. Congress passed this law in light of recent technological advances to address the 
very real and harmful effects that child pornography has on defenseless children. The images 
that the CPPA protects children from are generally images of naked prepubescent children in 
sexually explicit situations.
Ferber did not hold that the government could ban only child pornography that used 
actual children in its production. If the Supreme Court reads Ferber so narrowly, it undermines 
three decades of developing law that protects children from sexual exploitation. Though in 
Ferber, this Court looked at somewhat more realistic images, this Court did not distinguish 
between virtual and actual. This Court suggested that there was a danger that the New York 
statute would affect less graphic materials such as drawings. The "somewhat more realistic” 
approach that the Ferber Court took is directly analogous to the virtual child pornographic 
materials that are so lifelike that they are indistinguishable from real child pornographic 
materials. The CPPA resolved the problem of outdated child pornography laws because Ferber 
did not have the opportunity to assess the impact of virtual child pornography.
Child pornography has no redeeming social value, or it is "exceedingly modest, if not de 
minimis” at best. The CPPA merely codified Osborne v. Ohio when it expanded the definition 
of child pornography to include harm to children not used in the production of the sexually 
explicit material. 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990). Proscribing images that "appear to be” minors that
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in scxuaiiy ^.'Xpiicil conduct or ‘V. ■ cys the iniprcssion" ol' being niinors is the least
restrictive means of furthering the government’s interest. The CPPA combats the hnnns of child 
pornography in llirce ways; (1) it addresses the same harmful effects of actual child 
pornography; (2) it eases the virtually impossible burdcji on prosecution created by the 
advancement in technology; and (3) it continues in its efforts to eradicate the market for child 
pornography as a whole.
The Government has a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological 
well being of minors. The distribution of child pom is “intrinsically related” to the sexual abuse 
of children. To the viewer, there is no difference between the actual child and what “appears to 
be” a child. Congress stressed that these amendments were necessary to close loopholes in 
federal child pornography laws caused by advances in computer technology.
The Government has at least four separate arid distinct compelling interests that the 
CPPA furthers: (1) pedophiles use child pornography to whet their sexual appetites; (2) child 
pornography breaks down children’s inhibitions; (3) computer-generated images are so alike that 
it is virtually impossible for the government to prove that the images contained real children; (4) 
computer-generated child pornography allows for an underground market for child pornography 
under the guise of legality.
Congress carefully crafted the language of the CPPA to ensure it reached only materials 
necessary to ban child pornography. The CPPA prohibits virtual, computer-generated and 
images of young-looking adult that appear to be of minors in sexually explicit material and 
materials that people promote as child pornography. The CPPA targets a narrow class of 
sexually explicit images easily mistaken for photographs of real children because they are 
virtually indistinguishable. Even if there are a few arguably impermissible applications, this 
Court should not invalidate the CPPA. These limited applications should not prevent the
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government’s efforts to protect children. Whatever overbreadth may exist, courts can correct on 
a case-by-case basis.
The CPPA defines precisely what it prohibits so that an ordinary person can determine 
what conduct is illegal. The provisions, taken as a whole, prohibit the sexually explicit 
depictions of what appear to be minors and prevent materials of adults that market as child 
pornography. The statutory language of the CPPA provides little, if any, discretion to law 
enforcement officials. The law avoids arbitrary enforcement in several ways: (1) courts can 
apply the same objective standard in actual child pornography cases to determine the age of a 
person in a virtual child pornography case; (2) prosecutors must prove that the defendant has 
knowledge; and (3) the affirmative defenses provide definitions of permitted conduct.
This Court should declare the CPPA constitutional so the Government may continue its 
progress to ban child pornography and declare the CPPA constitutional. The Government 
properly furthers its compelling interest and does not violate any Constitutional rights.
ARGUMENT
I. THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY PREVENTION ACT PROTECTS CHILDREN FROM
SEXUAL ABUSE AND DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT
BECAUSE IT BANS AN ALREADY UNPROTECTED CATEGORY OF SPEECH.
Sexually explicit material that is virtually indistinguishable fi-om child pornography 
presents all the same problems as pornography that uses actual children. S. Rep. No. 104-358, 1, 
17-18 (1996). The First Amendment does not protect child pornography. N.Y. v. Ferber,45^ 
U.S. 747, 765 (1982). Virtual child pornography includes images that look real even though the 
children depicted in the images do not actually exist. S. Rep. No. 104-358 at 15-16. Through a 
technique called “morphing,” a picture of a real person is transformed into a sexually explicit 
picture of a child. Id Because virtual child pornography is virtually indistinguishable fi-om 
actual pornography there is no logical reason why the government cannot ban virtual child
13
pornography. The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (“CPPA”) bans sexually explicit 
material depicting minors. These images can easily be classified as child pornography. In 
essence, the CPPA bans only child pornography.
The protection given to First Amendment freedoms “against legislative abridgment is 
expansive.” U.S. v. Matthews, 209 F.3d 338, 341 (4th Cir. 2000). Courts have consistently 
preserved ideas that have “even the slightest social importance.” Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476,484 
(1957). The First Amendment fi'eedoms though secure are not absolute. Matthews, 209 F.3d at 
342.
A. Virtually Indistinguishable Images of Child Pornography Do Not Warrant First
Amendment Protection. Just as Actual Child Pornography Is Not Protected.
Child pornography is an “extraordinary problem.” Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103,109 
(1990). Children are vulnerable and the government should protect them to ensure a healthy 
society of adults. 458 U.S. at 757 (quoting v. 321 U.S. 158, 168(1944)).
Ferber entitled the legislature “greater leeway” to restrict child pornography because of the 
harms that it produces. 458 U.S. at 757. It also noted, “the prevention of sexual exploitation and 
abuse of children constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance.” Id. The aim of 
the CPPA is identical to the New York statute that the Ferber Court upheld as constitutional: to 
protect children fi'om sexual abuse. (J.A. 30.) At the same time, this Court should hold that the 
CPPA is constitutional because it protects children fi’om identical sexual abuse.
Technology allows visual depictions that “appear to be” of minors engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct to be virtually indistinguishable to imsuspecting viewers from un-retouched 
photographs of actual children engaging in identical sexual conduct. S. Rep. No. 104-358 at 7.
In response to public concern about such technological advances and the expansion of child 
pornography Congress passed a statute intended to help protect children. Id. Taken in context.
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the CPPA does nothing more than protect children. The CPPA reaches only depictions of minors 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
Any depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or 
computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, 
mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where-
(A)
(B)
the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor 
eneaeing in sexually explicit conduct:
such visual depiction is. or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexuallv
(C)
explicit conduct; or
such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that
(D)
an identifiable minor is engaging in sexuallv explicit conduct: or
such visual depiction is advertised, promoted, presented, described, or
distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression that the material
is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexuallv explicit
conduct.
18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (1999) (emphasis added).
B. The CPPA Codifies the Principles of Protecting Children from Sexual Abuse that
Under Gird Ferber and Osborne.
The CPPA protects depicted and non-depicted children. This Court has upheld statutes 
that protected depicted and non-depicted children in prior opinions. See Ferber^ 458 U.S. at 765; 
Osborne^ 495 U.S. at 126. The CPPA complies with Ferber because it bans child pornography. 
The CPPA does not ban child sexuality; it only bans the same material as this Court defines in 
Ferber. Ferber created a new form of unprotected speech by classifying child pornography as a 
category that is in and of itself devoid of any constitutional protection. 458 U.S. at 765. Any 
literary, artistic, political or scientific value of child pornography does nothing to ameliorate the 
harm caused to children. Matthews^ 209 F.3d at 345. Ferber holds that while the government 
can only ban obscene adult pornography, it can ban child pornography even if it is not obscene. 
458 U.S. at 764.
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Ferber created a new category of unprotected speech, which under the prior obscenity 
cases might have been illegal for the government to regulate. 458 U.S. at 765. Because of the 
overriding interest to protect our children, however, this Court held that child pornography does 
not have to be obscene to fall outside of the First Amendment. Id. This is because, unlike 
obscene adult pornography, child pornography reflects the State’s particular and more 
compelling interest in prosecuting those who promote the sexual exploitation of children. Id. at 
760-61.
When this Court decided Ferber, it did not intend that the only permissible restrictions by 
the government in the realm of child pornography include only the harm suffered by identifiable 
children used in its production. U.S. v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 919 (4th Cir. 2000). To read 
Ferber so narrowly would undermine three decades of federal law passed to protect children 
from sexual exploitation. Indeed, the law would regress to the initial child pornography statute 
passed by Congress in 1977. Though Ferber noted that justifiable government interests would 
extend only to material that “renders the portrayal somewhat more realistic by utilizing or 
photographing children,” this Court referred to the danger of censoring less graphic materials 
like drawings. 458 U.S. at 763. The “somewhat more realistic” approach that this Court took is 
directly analogous to the virtual child pornographic materials that are so lifelike they are 
indistinguishable from real child pornographic materials. S. Rep. No. 104-358 at 7.
The Miller obscenity test was not a “satisfactory solution to the child pornography 
problem.” 458 U.S. See Miller v. Ca/., 413 U.S. 15, 18(1973). Miller
obscenity test questioned whether the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the interest of the 
average person. Miller, 413 U.S. at 19. Ferber said that it was unnecessary due to the effects the 
speech has on children. 458 U.S. at 761. “It is irrelevant to the child being abused whether or 
not the material” is real. Id. This is especially the case where technology has become so
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advanced that the virtual images are indistinguishable from the un-retouched photographs. S. 
Rep. No. 104-358 at 7. The Constitution does not protect child pornography even if not obscene, 
as set forth by Miller. Ferber^ 458 U.S. at 765.
This Court focused not only on harm caused to actual children depicted but also to those 
affected by the sexually explicit material. Ferber addressed a statute involving actual children 
depicted in sexually explicit materials. Id. The Osborne Court went further than Ferber and not 
only focused on the harm caused to the depicted children but also on the harm caused to un­
depicted children. 495 U.S. at 111. focused on impact. Id. The CPPA addresses both
the harm on actual children depicted and the affects on other children. The CPPA does nothing 
more than codify the decisions of Osborne and Ferber.
Osborne upheld the government’s authority to regulate sexually explicit materials that 
harm children not depicted. Id. IfCongress, led by this Court, accepted that; (1) sexually 
explicit conduct is harmful not only to the depicted children but also to the non-depicted 
children; (2) there are images that are virtually indistinguishable from sexually explicit images 
involving actual children; and (3) it is also true that these virtual images cause harm to children, 
then it follows that the virtual images are also unprotected.
C. The Ninth Circuit Read Ferber Too Narrowly,
The Ninth Circuit limited the holding in Ferber to say that the First Amendment only 
bans child pornography that depicts actual children. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 
1083,1095 (9th Cir. 1999). It ignored the Osborne extension of the First Amendment 
protections to children that pedophiles harm by such pornography and went contrary to four 
other circuits. See U.S. v. Hilton^ 167 F.3d 61,65 (1st Cir. 1999); Mento, 231 F.3d at 923; U.S. 
V. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 397 (5th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 648 (11th Cir. 1999).
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If this Court decides that the Ninth Circuit read Ferber correctly where the limit on child 
pornography is solely the live performance of actual children, then it must reverse itself on two 
points. First, that child pornography is itself an unprotected category of speech. Second, the 
First Amendment does not protect speech that harms children not depicted in sexually explicit 
materials. Presently, this live requirement is outdated. Technology has completely changed the 
setting of the child pornography industry. Pedophiles alter real images to unidentifiable images. 
They create children and place them in sexually explicit positions to coerce actual children into 
participating in lewd acts with them. These acts are within the Ninth Circuit’s reading of Ferber. 
The Ninth Circuit eradicated the compelling governmental interests of protecting children from 
First Amendment analysis.
Child pornography cannot be an unprotected category of speech when it protects sexually 
explicit images that are virtually indistinguishable from actual images. There is no way to 
reconcile these two indistinguishable images and still sustain the compelling governmental 
interest of protecting children.
If this Court affirms the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the grim affects that virtual child 
pornography has on other children must be constitutional. The harms stemming from real and 
virtual images are indistinguishable. Pedophiles creating these virtual pornographic images use 
these images to make children vulnerable to molestation and sexual assault. Unfortunately, 
without the Osborne analysis, the law will not protect undepicted children, an aim held for years 
as being of “surpassing importance.” Ferber^ 458 U.S. at 757.
D- Congress Intended the CPPA to Continue to Protect Children from Harmful
Speech in Light of Recent Technological Advances.
The major concern the CPPA addresses is the protection of defenseless children from 
sexual exploitation. Such actions are not only immoral and obscene but justice can never prevail
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if the Constitution protects pedophiles at the expense of children. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757 (“A 
democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young 
people into full maturity as citizens.”) (quoting Pn«ce, 321 U.S. at 168). The CPPA successfully 
prohibited a number of the images that depicted children engaged in overt sexual acts with adults 
and with each other. Mento^lZX F.3dat915. In Me/iro, one of the images downloaded from the 
Internet included a child only five years old. Id. It is items such as these that the CPPA bans 
successfully.
CPPA resolved the problem of outdated child pornography laws. Hilton^ 167 F.3d at 65 
(“Congress enacted the CPPA to modernize federal law by enhancing its ability to combat child 
pornography in the cyberspace era.”). Vital judicial decisions did not have the opportunity to 
take technological advances into account. Ferber necessarily dealt only with depictions of actual 
children because its decision occurred “long before virtual child pornography was an issue.” 
Mento, 231- F.3d at 919. This Court unavoidably limited its analysis to the use of live children as 
proscribed in the New York statute. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 747.
Still, though Ferber did not have the opportunity to assess the impact of virtual child 
pornography because the technology had not yet developed, the essence otFerber was protecting 
children from harm. Id. at 756. The Coalition read Ferber out of context. Looking at Ferber as 
a whole, this Court upheld the government’s ability to regulate sexually explicit materials that 
lead pedophiles to molest children. Congress, through the CPPA, aligns its goals with Ferber. 
Because Senator Biden considers child pornography as having no redeeming value, he comments 
that child pornography deserves no First Amendment protection because of the harm it causes.
S. Rep. No. 104-358 at 28. All of the above reasons logically lead to an extension of the law to 
include virtual child pornography.
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H. UnForcsee:i TcchnolntzicLil Advances Obstruct ths Government’s Primary Goal of
Protecting Children
Congress passed the CPPA after technological advances disallowed the government to 
further its compelling interests of protecting children. Without the CPPA, vulnerable children 
have no means of protecting themselves. The hann children face from virtual child pornography 
is not one-dimensional. Pedophiles have found numerous ways to attack children while avoiding 
the law. As a result the goal of protecting children has multiple facets.
Virtual Pornography Has All the Same Harmful Effects as Child
Pornography that Involves Actual Children.
Congress aims to protect the physical and psychological well being of children. As this 
Court recognized in Ferber^ the government has a compelling state interest to achieve that end. 
Hilton^ 167 F.3d at 69. Child pornography is unprotected speech. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764. 
Because the speech categorized is within the confines of the given classification, and the harms 
of the restricted speech so overwhelmingly outweigh the expressive interests at stake, no process 
of case-by-case adjudication is necessary. Id. at 764. Even though child pornography is 
identified by its content, the government may regulate child pornography because the 
Constitution does not protect this category of speech. Hilton, 167 F.3d at 69.
Congress found that pornography involving actors who “appear to be” minors have all 
the same effects on child molesters as actual child pornography. S. Rep. No. 104-358 at 7. “It is 
evident beyond the need for elaboration that a state’s interest in safeguarding the physical and 
psychological well-being of a minor is compelling.” Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-57 (quoting Globe 
Newsp. Co. V. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)).
2- Virtual Child Pom Is “Intrinsically Related” to Sexual Abuse of Children^
Before the CPPA, Congress found that sexually explicit images that appear to be of 
minors are directly related to the sexual abuse of children. S. Rep. No. 104-358 at 2. The
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government “aspires to shield all children from sexual exploitation resulting from child
pornography.*’ MentOy 231 F.3d at 920. To the viewer, there is no difference between an actual
child and what “appears to be” a child. Id. Similarly, images that appear to be minors are just as
harmful and effective for coercion as any other form of child pornography. The only difference
is there may be no child involved in the production of that pornography. Hiltoriy 167 F.3d at 69.
Legislative history and congressional reasoning suggests the gravity of the compelling
state interest to protect children from virtual child pornography. The CPPA eliminates use of
computer technology for the creation and distribution of virtual child pornography. (J.A. 30.)
The CPPA was the next logical step in protecting children “due to technological advances in the
recording, creation, alteration, production, reproduction, distribution and transmission of visual
images and depictions, particularly through the use of computers.” (J.A. 30.) Congress stressed
that these laws were necessary to close loopholes in our federal child pornography laws caused
by advances in computer technology. (J.A. 51.) Senator Biden describes the crime of child
photography as a devastating act, damaging a child’s trust in others and their own sense of self-
respect and self-esteem. (J.A. 51.) Congress described child pornography as a
particularly pernicious evil, something that no civilized society can or 
should tolerate. It abuses, degrades and exploits the weakest and most 
vulnerable members of our society, our children. It poisons the minds and 
spirits of our youth, robbing them of their innocence, and debases our 
society as a whole...
and sought to fiirther combat the evils of child pornography. (J.A. 35.)
There are negative consequences if the CPPA is held unconstitutional. There are at least 
four separate and distinct compelling interests.
a. Pedophiles use child pornography to whet their sexual appetites. 
Mrs. Dee Jepsen, president of Enough is Enough, testified that pornography “is an 
addiction that escalates”, requiring more graphic or violent material for arousal, then leads to the
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person in the materials being seen as objects, without rights, dignity, personality or feelings.
(J.A. 36.) The final stage is ‘acting out,’ the pornography. (J.A. 36.) This stage directly leads to 
sexual exploitation and violent crimes. (J.A. 36.)
Dr. Victor Cline testified that the majority of pedophiles “use child pornography and/or 
create it to stimulate and whet their sexual appetites which they masturbate to then later use as a 
model for their sexual acting out with children.” (J.A. 36.) There is no other less restrictive 
means that the government can use to protect defenseless children against virtual child 
pornography. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Kevin Di Gregory testified that child 
pornography “represents a grave risk to children” and feeds pedophile lusts.” (J.A. 35.)
b. Child pornography breaks down children’s inhibitions.
Unregulated virtual child pornography allows pedophiles to brainwash young and 
vulnerable children with these virtual images. This will then lead to the acting out of the videos 
with actual children. (J.A. 36.) Congressional findings and judicial decisions stated that child 
molesters use child pornography to seduce their victims or coerce children into sexual activity. 
Osborne^ 495 U.S. at 109-11.
On June 4,1996, the Senate Committee heard testimonies to support the finding that the 
danger to actual children, with respect to child sexual abuse and exploitation, is as great when the 
child pomographer or child molester uses visual depictions of child sexual activity produced 
wholly or in part by computer technology, as when the material consists of un-retouched 
photographic images of actual children engaging in sexually explicit conduct. S. Rep. No. 104- 
358 at 21.
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c. The government cannot prove that the initial images contained real 
children.
The virtual images of children in sexually explicit positions do not appear to be modified 
with technology. Hilton, 167 F.3d at 72 (“Congress meant only to extend federal authority in an 
important but limited fashion to a specific subset of visual images- those which are easily 
mistaken for that of real children.”). The necessity for the “appears to be” language is that 
materials created as a product of abuse of actual minors, but then altered to make identification 
of the real child impossible will be constitutional. Id. at 73.
Virtual child pornography is “a powerful tool in pedophiles’ arsenals” because children 
who are reluctant to participate can “be convinced by viewing depictions of other children 
‘having fun’ participating in such activity.” Acheson, 195 F.3d at 649, (quoting Pub.L. No. 104- 
208, § 1(3) (1996)).
d. Virtual child pornography fuels underground market for 
pedophiles.
Computer generated child pornography allows for an underground market for child 
pornography under the guise of legality. With the ability to “morph” images via computer, 
pedophiles and pomographers create “custom-tailored” pornography, which heighten the 
material’s effect on the viewers and the threat on children. (J.A. 39.) Virtual child pornography 
whets the sexual appetites of pedophiles’ to the same extent that child pornography using real 
children in its production would. Pub.L. No. 104-208, § 1(8), These people use it for their own 
sexual arousal and gratification. (J.A. 36.) It is necessary to identify child pornography in a 
manner that includes images that “appear to be” minors because the two goals of the CPPA are 
to eliminate child pornography and the protection of children from sexual exploitation. Pub.L. 
No. 108-208, § 1(13)(1996). Given that such materials are of “child pornography,” they are 
outside the protection of the First Amendment. Fox, 248 F.3d at 404. The government may
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regulate the sexually explicit images “even to the extent of an outright ban.” Fox, 248 F.3d at 
404.
3. Value of Child Pom is “Exceedingly Modest. If Not De Minimis.”
The government has various concerns about the proliferation of child pornography. First 
the circulation of the child pornography invades “the child’s privacy interests.” Ferber, 458 U.S. 
at 758-59 n.9. The Ferber Court recognized that child pornography has a de minimis value. Id. 
at 762-63. Though the CPPA could include images produced without the use of actual children, 
Congress felt it was appropriate to regulate the obscene material. (J.A. 51.) Virtual child 
pornography is indistinguishable from live child pornography and needs regulation at the same 
low level as actual pornography to protect children from the indistinguishable harms that they 
will suffer. Because the images are virtually indistinguishable, the harm is likewise virtually 
indistinguishable. (J.A. 40-41.)
F. The CPPA Is Narrowly Tailored to Reach Sexually Explicit Images that Depict
Minors or that Appears To Be of Minors and Nothing More.
Congress considered all the evidence and heard hours of expert testimony before it 
passed the CPPA. To address the governmental compelling interest to ban child pornography. 
Congress amended pornography laws to prohibit virtual, computer-generated and young-looking 
adult images that appear to be of a child in sexually explicit material. The CPPA expands the 
definition of child pornography to include images that “appear to be” minors that engage in 
sexually explicit conduct or “conveys the impression” of being minors as the least restrictive 
means of furthering the government’s interest.
To satisfy the strict scrutiny test of content-based restriction on speech, the government 
must not only advance a compelling governmental interest, the restrictions must also be narrowly 
tailored to attain that end. V.S. v. Playboy Ent. Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 810 (2000). The
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CPPA satisfies strict scrutiny because the government selected the least restrictive means to 
further its compelling interest. Sable Communs. of Cal, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). 
The CPPA combats child pornography in three ways: (1) it addresses the same harmful effects 
of actual child pornography; (2) it eases the virtually impossible burden created by the 
advancement in technology; and (3) it continues in its efforts to eradicate the market for child 
pornography as a whole.
1. The CPPA Addresses the Same Harmful Effects of Actual Child 
Pornography.
This Court approved child pornography laws as narrowly tailored because of the causal 
link between child pornography and the sexual abuse and exploitation of children. See Ferber, 
458 U.S. at 759; Osborne. 495 U.S. at 111. The restrictions at issue here are tailored to prohibit 
those images that are virtually indistinguishable to unsuspecting viewers from unretouched 
photographs of actual children that engage in identical sexual conduct. S. Rep. No. 104-358 at 7. 
Congress has found that because the pornographic images are virtually indistinguishable, the 
harm is virtually indistinguishable. Id. at 17-18. As previously explained, the government has a 
compelling interest to protect against the harms of child pornography because pedophiles use 
child pom (1) to break down children’s inhibitions; and (2) to whet their appetites. Id. at 2. The 
CPPA extends to include virtual, computer-generated and young-looking adult images because 
pedophiles use these images for the same purposes of actual child pornography and create the 
same harmful effects. Congress found its least restrictive means was to extend the CPPA’s reach 
to further the governmental compelling interest to prevent the harms of child pornography.
2. Prosecutors Face an Insurmountable Burden to Prove Pornographic
Images Are of a Real Child in Light of Technological Advances.
Congress, after it considered the extensive evidence on the prosecutor’s impossible task 
of fighting child pornography in light of technological advances, expanded the CPPA’s
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definition to “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” to allow prosecutors to continue to 
protect our communities from the harms of child pornography. S. Rep. No. 104-358 at 20. The 
CPPA does not extend to protected speech. The previous child pornography laws are ineffective 
and unenforceable today. Prosecutors already have the high burden of proving culpability 
beyond a reasonable doubt. With previous laws, it is virtually impossible for prosecutors to meet 
their burden of proving that a pornographic image is of a real child. Id. As technology advances 
to the point where it is impossible to tell the difference between images of actual children and 
images without actual children, prosecutors face an insurmoimtable burden. Because previous 
child pornography laws required the use of actual children in its production, those laws created a 
built-in reasonable-doubt argument because it was extremely difficult for the government to 
identify the actual child involved. Mento, 231 F.3d at 920. As a result, statutes that prohibit 
child pornography only when produced using real children are unenforceable and pedophiles that 
possess pornographic depictions of actual children would escape liability. Id.
The “appears to be” language in the CPPA is the least restrictive way to ban child 
pornography because virtual, computer-generated and images of young-looking adults were 
virtually indistinguishable from photographic depictions of child sexual activity and therefore, 
have the same harmful effects as actual child pornography. Prosecutors can now use this 
language to reach sexually explicit material that appears to contain minors even when the 
identity is not available. Prosecutors now have to prove that the depiction “appears to be” that of 
a minor without the need to produce the original child pornography magazine against which to 
make a comparison. S. Rep. No. 104-358 at 20.
3. Congress Moves to Eradicate the Market for Child Pornography.
The technological advancements further fuel the underground child pornography 
industry. People can buy, sell or trade virtual, computer-generated and young-looking adult
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images like any other form of child pornography. Hilton^ 167 F.3d at 73. It effectively frustrates 
congressional efforts to eradicate the child pornography industry to eliminate the language 
“appears to be” and “conveys the impression.” Id. Before the CPPA, virtual images would 
continue to pass through interstate commerce and produce the same harmful effects to children 
and communities as actual child pornography. S. Rep. No. 104-358 at 7.
The CPPA allows the government to target sexually explicit material that “appears to be” 
of real children and eliminates materials from our communities that produce the same harmful 
effects as material previously prohibited. Though this definition expands to cover more material, 
this Court granted the government “greater leeway” to regulate these crimes because of its 
compelling interest. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757. It is also the only way to regulate child 
pornography given its secretive nature and the devastating impact on children. Vulnerable 
children lack the judgment to oppose advances of pedophiles and therefore, subject themselves to 
conduct that may leave permanent scars, haunting them for the rest of their lives. Pedophiles use 
child pornography to whet their appetites in their own homes and without the detection of law 
enforcement officers. The permanent harm to children occurs well before law enforcement 
officers are aware of it. As a result, it is necessary to eradicate the market for child pornography 
so that pedophiles never obtain sexually explicit materials to harm children.
4. Congress Limits the CPPA With Affirmative Defenses.
Congress limited the scope of the CPPA with two types of affirmative defenses. 18 
U.S.C. § 2252A. This illustrates that Congress intended to prohibit sexually explicit material 
that appears to include children and nothing more. Section 2252A(c) provides an affirmative 
defense to those who: (1) transport, receive, sell, distribute or reproduce materials if the person 
depicted was an actual adult at the time of creation; and (2) does not market materials as child 
pornography. The CPPA does not prohibit the use of adults in pornography as long as material
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does not promote child pornography. Producers may still use adults in sexually explicit 
materials, just not children. They can communicate the messages of child sexuality-just not of 
child pornography. Promoters can sell pornography, just not child pornography. Section 
2252A(d) provides a second affirmative defense. It is an affirmative defense to those charged 
with possession if they can show that they; (1) possessed fewer than three images of the 
prohibited child pornographic material; and (2) immediately and in good faith destroyed or 
reported the images to law enforcement. As a result, the CPPA does not make it a crime if a 
person accidentally receives child pornography.
The government uses the least restrictive means to combat child pornography, whether 
actual, virtual or computer-generated. Congress evaluated all the evidence and offered the CPPA 
as the least restrictive solution. The CPPA and its statutory language “appears to be” and 
“conveys the impression” prohibit sexually explicit images that produce the same effects and are 
virtually indistinguishable fi'om images that use actual children. S. Rep. No. 104-358 at 7. The 
statutory language “appears to be” is essential to further the government’s compelling purpose to 
ban child pornography. See Hilton, 167 F.3d at 730; Mento, 231 F.3d at 920. Curiously, the 
Coalition merely attacks the CPPA but fails to offer any solutions to the virtual child 
pornography problem. The reason is perhaps that there are no other less restrictive means to 
address the problem as the CPPA does.
II. THE CPPA REACHES ONLY SEXUALLY EXPLICIT MATERIALS THAT APPEAR
TO BE OF CHILDREN AND GOES NO FURTHER THAN NECESSARY TO BAN
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY.
The Coalition challenges the constitutionality of the Child Pornography Prevention Act 
of 1996 (“CPPA”) on another basis, the overbreadth doctrine. This Court first considered the 
overbreadth of a child pornography statute in Ferber. 458 U.S. at 747. This Court interpreted 
the New York statute that prohibited the use of children in a sexual performance as narrow
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enough to pass constitutional muster. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 747. Later, this court upheld an Ohio 
statute that prohibited the possession of three or more items of child pornography. Osborne v, 
OhiOy 495 U.S. 103, 126 (1990). Others raised the overbreadth doctrine to repeatedly attack the 
breadth of the CPPA in other child pornography cases but failed. See U.S. v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 
61. 65 (1st Cir, 1999); U.S. v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 923 (4th Cir. 2000); U.S. v. Fox, 248 F.3d 
394, 397 (5th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645,648 (11th Cir. 1999). The Ninth 
Circuit, against the better judgment of four other circuits, is the sole court to construe the CPPA 
as overbroad. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1095 (9th Cir. 1999).
The CPPA prohibits the visual depictions of a minor or what “appears to be a minor” 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B). It also criminalizes defendants 
that market sexually explicit material that contains adults to convey the impression of a minor.
18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D). The Coalition argues that the CPPA is unconstitutional because it’s 
“appears to be” and “conveys the impression” provisions are overbroad. (J.A. 2.) The Coalition 
contends that the CPPA’s reach includes depictions of adults that “appears to be” minors and 
bans a wide array of non-obscene material that has serious literary, artistic, political, and 
scientific value. (J.A. 5.) The CPPA is constitutional because its reaches only those images that 
convey the message of children in sexually explicit material.
A. Congress Carefully Crafted the Language of the CPPA’s to Ensure it Reached
Only Materials Necessary to Ban Child Pornography.
The CPPA reaches only sexually explicit images that appears to be of a minor that have 
the same harmful effects on children and nothing more. The Ninth Circuit failed to consider the 
CPPA’s plainly legitimate sweep when it applied “strong medicine” and struck down the CPPA. 
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769 (citing Broadrick v. Okla., 413 U.S. 601,615 (1973)). The overbreadth 
must be real and substantial “in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” Id. It applies
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only as a “last resort” to invalidate a statute when the overbreadth is “substantial.” Ferber, 458 
U.S. at 769. To invalidate a statute under the overbreadth doctrine, the statute must regulate 
substantially more conduct than the Constitution permits. Id. There is a strong presumption to 
validate a statute on constitutional grounds. Hiltonj 167 F.3d at 71. A statute is not overbroad 
“when a limiting construction has been or could be placed on the challenged statute.” BroadricK 
413 U.S. at 613. Even if the CPPA contains two meanings, one that gives rise to doubtful 
constitutional questions and the other that does not give rise to such questions, this Court has a 
duty to adopt the latter. Hilton^ 167 F.3d at 71.
This Court construes statutes narrowly to avoid overbreadth. Osborne^ 495 U.S. at 120. 
In Osbomey an Ohio state law made it illegal to possess or view child pornography. This law 
was constitutional because of state’s compelling interest to protect minors and the court’s ability 
to narrow the statute to avoid overbreadth. Id. This Court narrowed the construction of the Ohio 
statute to exclude people who viewed or possessed innocuous photographs of naked children 
because the Constitution protects mere nudity. Id.?X 113. The statute was not overbroad 
because it applied only to materials where a child is in a state of nudity that “constitutes a lewd 
exhibition or involves a graphic focus on the genitals.” Id. at 112.
This Court struck down an Alabama state statute as overbroad because it outlawed a 
range of activities that included protected speech as well as legitimately prohibited activity. 
Thornhill v. Ala.y 310 U.S. 88,97 (1940). Unlike that state statute, the CPPA limits only those 
legitimately prohibited activities. This Court, in Berber, recognized that the government has a 
compelling interest to ban child pornography and granted greater leeway to regulate. 458 U.S. at 
756. Congress recognized the same compelling interest and merely extended the scope of child 
pornography laws to include images that create virtually indistinguishable harm. S. Rep. No. 
104-358 at 7.
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A statute is overbroad if it forbids “the distribution of material with serious, literary, 
scientific, or educational value” which does not threaten the state’s compelling interest. Ferber, 
458 U.S. at 766. The extent of allowable breadth must relate to the purpose and nature of the 
doctrine. Id. at 111. In other words, the statute is not overbroad if it furthers the goals of 
Congress. If, however, the statute reaches depictions that Congress did not intend to protect 
against, the statute is overbroad.
Here, Congress through the CPPA, in its continued efforts to protect children from the 
secondary pernicious effects of child pornography, merely extends the reach of former 
constitutional laws to include virtual, computer-generated and adult images that appear to be 
child pornography. S. Rep. No. 104-358 at 7. Materials that do not depict children or what 
appear to be children, engaged in sexually explicit conduct, fall outside the scope of the CPPA as 
long as they are not marketed as such. The CPPA’s narrow scope does not reach adult 
pornography. It does not reach image of mere nudity including children. Congress stated that 
the CPPA criminalizes neither innocuous depictions of a minor nor “the proverbial parental 
picture of a child in a bathtub.” Id. at 20.
The CPPA is not overbroad because it does not criminalize an intolerable range of 
constitutionally protected conduct or speech. The statute’s ban of a visual depiction that 
“appears to be a minor” engaging in sexually explicit conduct applies to the same type of images 
already prohibited, but which does not require the use of an actual minor. S. Rep. No. 104-358 
at 21. The CPPA extends its reach to a narrow class of computer-generated pictures easily 
mistaken for real photographs of real children because it is virtually indistinguishable. Id. If the 
visual depiction is not virtually indistinguishable from an image that required the use of actual 
children, such as cartoons and drawings, it falls beyond the reach of the statute.
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B. There Are Few Arguably Impermissible Applications of the CPPA.
The CPPA is valid because its “legitimate reach dwarfs its arguably impermissible 
applications.” Ferber, 458 U.S. at 773. One can always imagine some remote impermissible 
applications of any law. This Court addressed the concern that certain protected expressions 
such as medical textbooks may fall under the sweep of the New York child pornography statute 
and stated that these arguably impermissible applications of the statute amount to no more than a 
tiny fraction of the materials within the statute’s reach. Id. at 773. As it did in Ferber, this Court 
should not prevent the government from its efforts to further the strong interest to ban child 
pornography. These limited applications should not undo the purpose of the CPPA. Courts can 
correct whatever overbreadth exists on a case-by-case basis rather than declare the statute 
unconstitutional. Id. at 772.
C. The CPPA Provides Affirmative Defenses to Limit Its Scope.
As further evidence of Congress’s purpose to only prohibit images that produce the same 
harmful effects of child pornography, the CPPA’s affirmative defenses narrow its breadth. A 
defendant may introduce evidence to prove that the pornography was: (1) of an actual person or 
persons; (2) “each such person was an adult” at the time of production; and (3) the defendant did 
not “advertise, promote, present, describe, or distribute the material in such a manner as to 
convey the impression” that it is child pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c)(27). This narrows 
the scope of the CPPA substantially. The CPPA does not prohibit depictions that are not 
virtually indistinguishable from actual child pornography and not advertised as such. Actual 
adult pornography and mere nudity of children do not fall into the breadth of the CPPA.
The second affirmative defense provides a safe harbor for defendants that (1) possess less 
than three images of child pornography; and (2) “promptly and in good faith” take reasonable 
steps to destroy those images and report the matter to law enforcement. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(d).
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The CPPA merely targets those individuals that intentionally possess large quantities of child 
pornography. Like the Ohio state statute in Osborne^ the CPPA does not convict people that 
accidentally receive child pornography. 495 U.S. at 106. This Court determined the Ohio 
statute’s breadth to be constitutionally narrow. Id. at 112. As the CPPA’s breadth is also 
narrow, this Court should hold the CPPA constitutional.
III. THE CPPA DEFINES SPECIFICALLY FOUR FORBIDDEN CATEGORIES OF 
SEXUALLY EXPLICIT MATERIALS SO THAT AN ORDINARY PERSON OF 
REASONABLE INTELLIGENCE SHOULD KNOW WHAT CONDUCT IT 
PROHIBITS.
The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (“CPPA”) is not vague. It defines 
precisely what it prohibits: (1) sexually explicit images of actual children; (2) altered images of 
children in sexually explicit materials; (3) sexually explicit images virtually indistinguishable 
from photographs; and (4) images of young-looking adults portrayed as children. The CPPA’s 
comprehensive definition of sexually explicit conduct is quite graphic and includes genital- 
genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal sexual intercourse, bestiality, masturbation, 
sadistic or masochistic abuse and lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area. Anyone 
using common sense will understand these definitions. They are specific enough to lay out 
exactly what conduct is illegal.
Similar to the overbreadth attacks, others unsuccessfully challenged similar child 
pornography statutes on vagueness grounds. SeeN.Y. v. Ferberj 458 U.S. 747,774 (1982); 
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103,126 (1990). Four circuits rejected vagueness challenges on the 
CPPA. See U.S. v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61,65 (IstCir. 1999); U.S v. Mento,23\ F.3d 912,923 (4th 
Cir. 2000); US. v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 397 (5th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 648 
(11th Cir. 1999). Once again, the Ninth Circuit, contrary and against the greater wisdom of four
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other circuits, is the sole court to construe the CPPA as vague. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 
198 F.3d 1083,1095 (9th Cir.1999).
A statute is void for vagueness only if it fails: (1) to define the criminal offense with 
sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct it prohibits; and (2) to 
prevent arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. Kolendar v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). 
A statute is void for vagueness if it does not put the average reasonable person on notice of the 
illegal conduct. Acheson, 195 F.3d at 652. The CPPA is constitutional because defines the 
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness and does not result in arbitrary or discriminatory 
enforcement.
A. The Statutory Language of the CPPA Provides Sufficient Definitions.
The CPPA defines the criminal offenses with enough certainty to put a person of 
reasonable intelligence on notice of what conduct it prohibits. The CPPA bans four categories of 
sexually explicit material: (1) actual pictures of actual minors; (2) altered pictures of minors; (3) 
pictures that appear to be of minors; and (4) pictures that convey the message of minors. 18 
U.S.C. § 2252; Menlo, 231 F.3d at 922. These categories are as precise, if not more precise, than 
the New York statute upheld in Ferber. 458 U.S. at 750.
This Court held a California loitering law unconstitutional. Kolendar, 461 U.S. at 361. 
Under California law, the police could require people who loitered or wandered the street to 
provide credible and reliable identification and to account for their presence. Id. at 353. The 
statute was unconstitutional because it failed to clarify what would constitute credible and 
reliable identification. Id. As drafted and construed by state courts, there was no standard to 
determine what a person must do to satisfy the requirement of providing credible and reliable 
identification. Id. at 358. As a result, police had complete discretion to determine whether a 
person had satisfied the requirement. Id. Unlike the Kolendar statute, the statutory language of
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the CPPA provides little, if any, discretion to law enforcement officials. The CPPA defines 
precisely what constitutes “sexually explicit conduct” and “minors.” Depictions that contain or 
simulate both terms are illegal. If law enforcement officers find materials that fit one but not 
both of the descriptions, they do not have the discretion to arrest or prosecute.
To avoid vagueness, this Court in Ferber required child pornography legislation: (1) to 
adequately define the prohibited conduct; (2) limit to visual depictions of children below a 
specific age; and (3) suitably limit and describe the category of forbidden sexual conduct. 458 
U.S. at 764. The New York statute was constitutional because it: (1) defined the prohibited 
conduct as materials that promote the sexual performance of a child; (2) limited to children under 
the age of 16; and (3) suitably limited and described the category of forbidden sexual conduct to 
include distributed materials that used actual children in sexual performance. Ferber^ 458 U.S. 
at 764.
Similar to the New York statute in Ferber, the CPPA is constitutional because it 
adequately defines the prohibited conduct so that a person of reasonable intelligence can 
determine what is illegal. The CPPA prohibits any visual depiction of minors or what appears to 
be minors in sexually explicit materials and materials of young-looking adults marketed as child 
pornography. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8). The statute specifically defines minors as “any person under 
the age of eighteen years.” 18 U.S.C. § 2256(1). Section 2256(2) defines sexually explicit 
conduct as:
actual or simulated (A) sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, 
anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex;
(B) bestiality; (C) masturbation; (D) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or (E) 
lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person.
The New York statute in Ferber defines the forbidden conduct “with sufficient
precision.” 458 U.S. at 765. The Ferber statute includes “simulated sexual intercourse” as a
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forbidden act. 458 U.S. at 750. The dictionary defines “simulate** as “to give the impression or 
effect of.** Webster’s 3rd New International Dictionary Unabridged 2122 (Philip Gove ed., 
Merriam Webster Inc. 1993). The words “appears to be,** “conveys the impression” and 
“simulate” are interchangeable because they all have the same meaning. It is illogical to 
construe the word “simulate** in the Ferber statute as precise and construe other words with the 
same meaning as imprecise. Like the language in Ferber, the statutory language of the CPPA 
defines the forbidden act “with sufficient precision.”
People must know that the material is child pornography or material marketed as such 
before faced with charges. The CPPA contains a scienter requirement that defines the prohibited 
conduct to contain a “knowing** element. If a person does not know that the material contained 
images of a child or appear to be a child, that person would not violate the CPPA. Congress, 
through the CPPA, intends to prosecute people who seek and use child pornography harmful to 
children. Given the detailed definitions set forth in the CPPA, an ordinary person can determine 
what conduct is illegal. The statute prohibits previously forbidden depictions of minors but 
merely extends that to computer-generated and images of young-looking adults portrayed as 
child pornography.
The CPPA suitably limits and describes the forbidden conduct as (1) a visual depiction of 
a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct and (2) a sexually explicit depiction of a young- 
looking adult that markets or sells as child pornography. If the depiction does not involve 
children and the defendant did not market the sexually explicit materials to include children, the 
CPPA does not prohibit it.
The Coalition provides further evidence that the language of the CPPA is not vague. 
Harlan Shapers and George Polera, members of the Coalition, in their affidavits stated that they 
have removed products and images from their shelves and websites to escape prosecution under
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the CPPA. (J.A. 19-23.) This illustrates that the CPPA is not too vague because these members 
conformed their activities to escape the reach of the CPPA.
The CPPA is not vague because it is contains specific definitions of the illegal conduct. 
The provisions, taken as a whole, prohibit the sexually explicit depictions of minors and prevent 
materials of young-looking adults that market as child pornography.
B. The CPPA Does Not Result in Arbitrary or Discriminatory Enforcement.
For the same reasons that ordinary people know what conduct is illegal, law enforcement 
officials would know. The CPPA contains specific definitions to prevent arbitrary enforcement. 
Laws are not unconstitutionally vague if the legislature established minimum standards to govern 
law enforcement. Kolendar, 461 U.S. at 358. The CPPA defines child pornography to include 
virtual, computer-generated and images of young-looking adults portrayed as child pornography 
without the result of arbitrary enforcement. Indeed, the CPPA merely provides prosecutors the 
necessary tools to continue enforcement as previously allowed. S. Rep. No. 104-358 at 16.
Technology makes it increasingly difficult for prosecutors to enforce child pornography 
laws, as it is harder and harder to prove without a reasonable doubt that the material involves 
actual children. Id. at 16. Advances in technology permit the production of computer-generated 
images to be virtually indistinguishable fi-om images using real children. Id. at 7. This extension 
merely allows the government to close the computer-generated loophole in our existing laws and 
gives our law enforcement authorities the tools they need. Id. at 18.
1. Objective Standard Sets a Clear and Precise Standard.
The Ninth Circuit erred when it held that the language “appears to be” and “conveys the 
impression” are highly subjective and leads to arbitrary enforcement. Free Speech Coalition,
198 F.3d at 1095. The government can use the same type of objective evidence that it relied on 
before the CPPA. Hilton, 167 F.3d at 75. In Hilton, the court held that a jury must decide, based
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on the totality of the circumstances, whether a reasonable unsuspecting viewer considers the 
depiction to be of an actual individual less than 18 engaged in sexual activity. Hilton^ 167 F.3d 
at 75. Objective proof can establish the age of the person shown by: (1) the physical 
characteristics of the person; (2) expert testimony as to the physical development of the model; 
(3) how the creator or distributor labeled or marked the disk, file, or video; and (4) how the 
promoter described or advertised the material. Id. Cases of virtual child pornography can apply 
the same objective standard as the standard used in actual child pornography cases.
2. The **Knowing** Scienter Requirement Safeguards Against Inadvertent
Violations.
The CPPA’s scienter requirement protects against arbitrary enforcement. The statute 
applies only a person who “knowingly” mails, transports, ships, receives, distributes, reproduces, 
sells or possesses child pornography. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A. The scienter requirement requires the 
government to show that the defendant: (1) purposely acquired or distributed the material; and 
(2) believes that the material was sexually explicit and depicts a person who appeared under 18 
years of age. Hilton^ 167 F.3d at 75. A reasonable unsuspecting viewer who honestly believed 
that the depiction was not of a minor is immune.
3. The Affirmative Defenses Define Conduct Not Prohibited.
The CPPA sets forth prosecutorial guidelines in its affirmative defense. A defendant 
does not violate the CPPA if evidence shows that the pornography is of an actual adult person 
and the defendant did not market the material of young-looking adults as child pornography. 18 
U.S.C. § 2252A. The CPPA’s second affirmative defense defines protected conduct in section 
2252(A)(d). This affirmative defense provides a safe harbor for defendants that possess less than 
three items of child pornography and promptly and in good faith destroy or report the images to 
law enforcement. These affirmative defenses clearly define conduct that the Constitution
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protects. Law enforcement officers and prosecutors are aware of the CPPA limitations and 
would not pursue conduct defined as protected in its affirmative defenses. Fox, 248 F.3d at 407.
The CPPA defines with sufficient definiteness the illegal conduct and does not result in 
arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. The Coalition unnecessarily seeks to protect an area 
that is outside the reach of the CPPA and not subject to enforcement- pornographic depictions of 
adults marketed as adult pornography. The safeguards against improper enforcement illustrate 
that the government focuses its prosecutory energy on heart of the child pornography problem- 
the pre-pubescent child pornography market. Id.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court REVERSE 
the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit holding the CPPA’s 
statutory language “appears to be a minor” and “conveys the impression” as unconstitutional.
Respectfully Submitted,
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